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was delighted to receive the invitation to speak at this, the 14th annual research 
retreat sponsored by the Merrill Center for Advanced Studies at KU. I was 
privileged to attend and speak to the very first of these retreats in 1997, attending 
as the relatively new chancellor of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. At that 
conference, my task was to be the clean-up hitter, listening to the presentations of 
faculty from the several institutions, summing up what I heard, and adding my own 
reflections in a piece I called “The Agenda for Change.”   
My task this time as the lead-off 
hitter is much more daunting, without 
the benefit of the shared wisdom of 
those of you in this room to draw on. It 
is our good fortune that I am followed in 
the line-up by two great hitters, Harvey 
Perlman and Bernadette Gray-Little, and 
I am confident of their ability to knock 
me in, provided I can get on base.  
My charge from Mabel Rice is to 
articulate how top leaders can sustain 
research excellence for a public university in 
a time of fluctuating and uncertain public 
and financial support. She suggested that I 
might provide a list of the ten most 
useful things I learned about leading a 
research university, drawing most 
heavily from my eight years as 
chancellor of UNC Chapel Hill. In this 
paper, I will develop ten general 
principles, which I hope you will find 
helpful.  
The perspective from the top . . . 
That reminds me of a story: 
A man in a hot-air balloon realized that 
he was lost. He reduced altitude and spotted 
a woman below. “Excuse me,” he shouted. 
“Can you help? I promised a friend I would 
meet him an hour ago, but I don’t know 
where I am.”  
The woman looked up and replied: “You 
are in a hot-air balloon hovering 
approximately 30 feet above the ground. You 
are between 40 and 41 degrees north latitude 
and between 59 and 60 degrees west 
longitude.” 
“You must be an engineer,” said the 
balloonist. 
“I am,” replied the woman. “How did 
you know?” 
“Well,” said the balloonist, “everything 
you told me is technically correct, but I have 
no idea what to make of your information – 
and the fact is, I am still lost. Frankly, 
you’ve not been much help so far.” 
I 
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“Well,” said the woman, “you must be 
an administrator.” 
“I am,” said the balloonist. “How did 
you know?” 
“Well,” said the woman, “you don’t 
know where you are or where you are going. 
You have risen to where you are due to a 
large quantity of hot air. You made a 
promise that you have no idea how to keep. 
And you expect people beneath you to solve 
your problems. The fact is that you are in 
exactly the same place you were before we 
met – but, now, somehow, it’s my fault.” 
Notwithstanding the cynicism of 
that little story, I believe that top 
leadership can impact the direction of a 
university; it can help create a climate 
that supports excellence in research; 
indeed, it can create a culture of 
excellence in an institution.  
A savvy leader, unlike the 
balloonist, knows where he or she is – 
not just the geographical coordinates, 
but more critically, the history and 
culture of the institution, the state, and 
the region.  Large universities turn like 
battle ships. Course corrections are 
possible, but only gradually, by 
increments.  
We must always remember that a 
research university is a complex 
organization with a diffuse power 
structure. Presidents and chancellors 
lead by persuasion, not by fiat. Indeed, 
the more successful an institution is in 
attracting external funding, whether 
from peer-reviewed grants, foundations, 
or donors, the more decentralized the 
institution becomes.  A highly successful 
faculty member can control more 
resources than many deans or 
department chairs.  
As I began to think about these 
remarks, it occurred to me that I should 
review what I said back in 1997. Indeed, 
the first two principles I will give you 
this morning come from that earlier 
paper.  
Paul Cheney, a distinguished KU 
neurophysiologist, made a compelling 
argument for lowering the walls that 
divide the many silos inside the 
academy. He quoted Mark Rogers, then 
the Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs at 
Duke, who wrote the following:  
“The institutions that will succeed [in 
the future] are those that can reorganize 
themselves to address scientific and 
educational questions in an interdisciplinary 
manner. The institutions that will have 
difficulty are the ones that keep the same 
rigid structure that prevents pollination 
among disciplines.”1 
That concept became a mantra for 
me at Nebraska and later at North 
Carolina. The more I realized the futility 
of attempting to dismantle hardened 
walls, the more I began to use the 
language of biology to speak of walls 
that were more like permeable membranes.  
However one characterizes it, this is 
an essential culture for a successful 
research university.  
Eli Michaelis, the chair of KU’s 
pharmacology and toxicology 
department, spoke eloquently about the 
two factors that drive successful 
researchers –uncertainty and urgency. He 
also spoke candidly and revealingly 
about his own fear of failure, observing 
that the most audacious objectives 
carried with them the greatest risk of 
failure. I distilled a principle out of this 
that I applied to my own objectives for 
two universities:  The greater the attempt, 
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the greater the reward, and also the greater 
the risk of failure. It is this sobering 
realization, however, that often leads to 
the ultimate failure of leadership – the 
failure to act. Institutions that coast are, 
by definition, on a down-hill track.    
I arrived in Chapel Hill in August of 
2000 at a precipitous moment in the 
history of this, the oldest public 
university in America. The campus was 
showing its age. After years of neglect 
from the state, deferred maintenance 
was at an alarming stage. Our world-
class chemistry department was still 
teaching and doing research in a 1925 
building. The music library, one of the 
three strongest research collections in 
America, was housed in a basement of 
an old Carnegie Library with leaking 
pipes running overhead. I was replacing 
a chancellor who had died in office, 
leaving a substantial structural 
budgetary deficit.  I had to find a 
provost, a chief financial officer, and a 
chief research officer.  
To counterbalance these problems 
(which I saw as opportunities) were 
many positives.  First, I discovered an 
incredibly positive faculty culture. 
Unlike my experience at three other 
universities, where the best faculty had 
opted out of governance, some of UNC’s 
most distinguished faculty were highly 
active in governance and eager to work 
with a new chancellor. It was not 
uncommon for the faculty chair to be a 
member of one of the national 
academies. UNC was recognized in the 
then-just released Lombardi ranking of 
research universities as one of only four 
public research universities in the top 
tier along with Berkeley, Michigan, and 
UCLA.  
I quickly realized that the strategies 
I had employed at Nebraska, and earlier 
as provost at South Carolina, with 
significant reallocation of funds from 
marginal areas to concentrated and 
focused areas of excellence, would be 
inappropriate for a university with very 
few areas that could be called weak, and 
many that were excellent and highly 
regarded. I adopted a strategy that we 
would have a low tolerance for marginal 
programs, which meant, with a small 
number of such programs, we could 
afford to move resources to shore them 
up. 
(If there is a principle that can be 
distilled here, I believe it is this: 
In developing institutional strategic 
objectives, one must always begin with 
an honest institutional assessment. I 
strongly believe in setting high goals, 
but those goals need to be grounded in 
reality). 
On the November, 2000 ballot was a 
$3.2 Billion higher education 
construction bond issue, of which $525 
Million was slated to go to Chapel Hill. 
In my installation address in October, I 
took a deep breath and pledged to the 
voters that we would triple that 
investment in private fund raising if 
they would approve the bonds. (We 
were on the cusp of announcing a billion 
dollar-plus capital campaign, but I had 
great anxiety about our ability to raise 
that kind of money. This is an example 
of my earlier point about the fear of 
failure.)  
Timing is everything – in hand 
grenades, music, and politics. In 
November of 2000, the dot-com bust was 
still over the horizon.  People were 
optimistic. The voters approved the 
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bond issue with a 75% plurality, passing 
in all 100 counties. It stands, still to this 
day, as the largest higher education 
construction bond ever passed by any 
state.  Fortunately, because of the 
success of the Carolina First Campaign, 
which ultimately raised $2.4 Billion for 
academic support including 225 
endowed chairs, nearly a thousand new 
scholarships and fellowships, and 
significant commitments to facilities for 
research, I was able to relax. At the end 
of the day, we had increased the state’s 
investment five-fold.  
I realized that this was a critical 
moment in the history of this university. 
UNC was highly ranked, but also highly 
vulnerable, due to these obvious 
deficiencies in the infrastructure and 
relatively low faculty salaries. 
Instinctively, I felt that this was the right 
time for a major investment in big 
science. We had obvious strengths on 
which to build, and I knew that it would 
be a fatal mistake to begin my first big 
efforts in my own playground of the arts 
and humanities. I also realized that I 
needed really a strong internal 
leadership team to develop a strategy. 
With my lack of background in science, I 
needed senior colleagues with strong 
research credentials.  So, I recruited 
Robert Shelton, the vice president for 
research of the University of California, 
a physicist and former department chair 
at UC-Davis, to be provost. We recruited 
Tony Waldrop, the vice chancellor for 
research at Illinois, to take the same 
position at UNC. (When Shelton left 
after several years to become president 
of the University of Arizona, I named 
Bernadette Gray-Little, the dean of the 
College and now KU’s chancellor, to be 
our provost.) I always had a strong 
colleague in that essential office.  
We decided that the capital 
construction program, which over eight 
years grew to $2.2 Billion and more than 
6 Million new square feet, would be 
front-end loaded with research and 
teaching facilities for the physical 
sciences, medicine, public health, and 
pharmacy. We drafted our leading 
research faculty into planning teams for 
these new buildings. (The ability to 
dream and then build new facilities is 
one of the strongest retention devices I 
know.) We also used these new facilities, 
even in the planning stages, as the hooks 
for recruiting new faculty. Every area of 
the university was affected by this 
infusion of support, but none more than 
the physical science departments of the 
College – chemistry, physics and 
astronomy, marine science, biology, and 
computer science.  
Early on, in my very first year, 
when we were fortunate enough to 
receive a huge bolus of new faculty lines 
due to enrollment growth, we made the 
critical decision to hold back 18 lines for 
a new investment in genomics to create 
the Carolina Center for Genome 
Sciences, with faculty appointments 
from seven different academic units 
representing over 15 departments and 
disciplines. To chair a new department 
of genetics in the School of Medicine, we 
recruited Terry Magnuson from Case 
Western Reserve University. He brought 
with him his 15-member research group, 
and 10,000 mice. Magnuson is a pre-
eminent geneticist who could have gone 
anywhere but chose Carolina because he 
was attracted by the idea of creating a 
really big center. Candidly, another part 
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of the attraction was the fact that we 
promised him a building. Ultimately, we 
built two massive research buildings, 
with still two more on the way. Terry 
now helps us recruit new faculty telling 
them, “these people make promises, and 
they deliver. They keep their word.” 
What are the lessons from this 
experience that I can pass on to you as 
principles? First, physical facilities 
matter. We are, indeed, in an arms race 
of facilities, and the best faculty will 
migrate to the places that provide them 
the tools to do their best work.  That 
means state-of-the art equipment. But it 
also means flexible space that is well 
designed to maximize human 
interaction.  We designed our buildings 
with connecting bridges and with 
meeting spaces and break-out rooms 
along the corridors and even in the 
bridges to encourage and facilitate the 
occasional “ah-ha” moments that 
sometimes lead to creative 
breakthroughs.  Our goal was that this 
science complex (which is still under 
construction ten years later) would 
allow one to walk through all the science 
departments in the College to the health 
science schools in one continuum.)  
The corollary principle, one that I 
articulated in 1997, is: faculty have to 
be recruited in clusters, not one at a 
time. The really big questions cross all 
the traditional boundaries. This means 
that departments can no longer exercise 
complete autonomy over hiring. I don’t 
mean to suggest a totally top-down 
process for hiring decisions, but rather a 
negotiated process involving the provost 
and the top leadership.  
To pursue such a strategy requires a 
plan, an architecture for strategic 
investment. Once I had the leadership 
team in place, I charged the provost with 
the development of an academic plan, 
which we adopted in July, 2003. A good 
plan needs to be specific enough to 
include concrete action steps, 
assignment of responsibility and a 
mechanism for measuring success. It 
also needs to be flexible enough to allow 
for opportunistic adjustments as the 
environment evolves. 
Building Public Support 
As I think back about my eight 
years in the chancellor’s office, I am 
struck by how much of my time and 
effort was devoted to building public 
support for the university’s research 
mission.  We learned much from the 
successful campaign in the fall of 2000 to 
pass the higher education construction 
bond. We learned that there was a large 
reservoir of support for the university 
among the people of North Carolina. 
They loved us, but they knew very little 
about what we do or how we contribute 
to the betterment of their existence, other 
than the education of their sons and 
daughters.  That told us we had some 
major work to do in telling our story. 
That also translated into problems 
we had in the state legislature. For years, 
the state and/or the university system 
had been reducing our state 
appropriation by a percentage (up to 
25%) of our federal F&A receipts, with 
the mistaken view that the campus was 
adequately compensated for its conduct 
of research, and these state funds 
constituted “double dipping.” (This, of 
course, reflects a total misunderstanding 
of the inadequacy of the federal F&A 
rate, which needs no discussion here.) 
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I helped our Board of Trustees 
understand how critical reversing this 
practice was to moving forward the 
university’s research agenda. We had an 
urgent case in the construction of the 
science complex, where a portion of the 
first phase was going to be shelled-in 
without additional resources. (The state 
had included a private fund-raising 
component for every one of our projects 
that received the total $525 million in 
bond funds.)  We needed to build out 
the shelled space in order to retain a key 
faculty member who was being heavily 
recruited by several other universities, 
but we had not yet raised the private 
funds. We devised a plan to finish the 
space by using F&A funds to back-stop 
future private fund-raising. But that plan 
would fail, if the state, in effect, took 
part of our F&A away.  
Our board mobilized and formed a 
political action committee, which in a 
short period of time became one of the 
most powerful political lobbies in North 
Carolina, the second largest political 
action group in the state. The PAC’s 
existence and effectiveness were not 
always appreciated by the system 
administration and board, and it was 
regularly attacked in the editorial pages 
of the local press as it grew more and 
more powerful.  
The PAC quickly made a legislator’s 
position on F&A retention as the proxy 
for being a friend of Chapel Hill and 
thus meriting the PAC’s support. 
Gradually, the climate on our retention 
of F&A receipts began to change. I recall 
the first time I had to testify before a 
legislative committee, facing open 
skepticism about our plans for using 
F&A receipts to leverage research 
growth.  
I decided to try to disarm them with 
a little self-deprecating humor saying, 
“Proteomics, Genomics, . . . all these 
“omics.” What do I know about them? 
I’m only a humble village organist.” This 
seemed to work. They smiled and 
relaxed and began to listen. The point I 
really wanted to make is that we 
intended to use F&A receipts, including 
anticipated receipts on future research, 
as front-end cash to build out our 
research facilities, to back-stop 
anticipated private fund-raising. 
Fortunately, over time, we began to 
win those arguments. While I would like 
to think it was the force and logic of our 
argument that won the day, I cannot 
discount the political power of the PAC. 
However, it was not all brute political 
force. Gradually, we began to succeed in 
connecting research to economic 
development, a powerful argument for 
state support. We marshaled the support 
of the major private sector research-
based firms in Research Triangle Park, 
many of which had their origins in 
university-based research. The CEOs of 
these firms contributed directly to the 
PAC and they spoke up for us in the 
legislature.  
Gradually, we turned the tide on 
F&A receipts, and in a couple of years 
there were no more recorded votes on 
UNC’s F&A receipts. We were free of 
any state or system control with regard 
to their usage, allowing us to use F&A 
funds to finish space in the new science 
complex that would have otherwise 
been shelled-in, creating research space 
that enabled us to win a fierce battle to 
retain a key scientist. With this 
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dedicated space and about ten new 
faculty lines, we established a new 
Institute for Advanced Materials, 
Nanoscience, and Technology.  I recall 
that the year we did this, 2002, was a 
particularly difficult year, in which we 
were facing budget cuts, and I took some 
political risk in making such a bold 
move in an otherwise down year. In my 
State of the University address in 
September, I said this: 
Some will argue that we cannot afford 
new initiatives in the current environment. I 
would respond that, while we must be very 
judicious in taking on new projects, we 
cannot afford not to build on our strengths 
to be the very best that we can be. I think we 
should all agree on one thing – that we will 
start nothing that we are not willing to 
support sufficiently to make it a top-10 
program within a reasonable period of time. 
We must be willing to pull the plug of life 
support on new programs that fail to meet 
that threshold.2 
This was an investment that paid 
off. Within five years, UNC was in the 
top ten nationally based on NSF funding 
in this area, competing with universities 
all of which had big engineering schools.  
Between 2000 and 2009, UNC 
plowed $43 Million in F&A funds 
directly into research facilities, and 
another $90 Million into debt service on 
research construction with an asset 
valuation of $236 Million.   
What began as a defensive strategy 
to protect our F&A receipts gradually 
evolved into a continuing program of 
advocacy for the university and its 
research enterprise.  By the end of my 
tenure, we were coming to the end of the 
funding stream from the Higher 
Education Construction Bond, and yet 
our needs and aspirations had 
expanded. Also, by this time, we had 
established strong relationships with the 
political leadership in the North 
Carolina Senate, who had become strong 
supporters, some would say patrons, of 
UNC’s research enterprise.  In fairly 
rapid succession, the North Carolina 
legislature funded a new UNC Cancer 
Hospital ($180 M), a new research 
building for the School of Dentistry, and 
a bio-medical imaging building ($350 
M), the last in a year when there was no 
other capital construction funding 
anywhere else in the state. However, the 
most stunning demonstration of the 
legislature’s support for UNC research 
was the appropriation in 2008 of $50 
Million in continuing funding for cancer 
research. UNC is effectively leveraging 
that funding stream to increase its 
funding from federal sources. 
The point to be made here is the 
importance of building public and 
political support in our respective states 
for the research enterprise of a public 
research university. We should 
capitalize on our status as flagship 
institutions and make the case to state 
policy makers that we are the principal 
drivers of innovation that leads to 
economic development and job creation. 
This case is easier to make today than it 
was ten years ago. We should never 
apologize for being research 
universities; we should never apologize 
for research, but rather celebrate it and 
find ways to connect our research to 
people’s lives.  
One of the clearest paths of 
connection to people’s lives is through 
our educational outreach programs. At 
UNC, the Morehead Planetarium and 
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Science Center has long been the center 
of our outreach for children and youth.  
One out of three North Carolinians 
under the age of 18 has visited the 
Morehead on campus. Thousands more 
have benefited from the “science bus” 
that takes hands-on science experiences 
to North Carolina high schools. Next 
fall, the Morehead will sponsor a two-
week state-wide science festival, with 
over 400 events in 100 plus locations 
across North Carolina.  Our goal is to 
put the spotlight on science, to do for 
science in the 21st century what state 
fairs did for agriculture in the 20th.  We 
believe that this is a model that can be 
adopted by other states, and we are 
inviting people from other states to 
come as observers. While this is not 
designed as a public relations tool, we 
believe this festival can have a powerful 
effect in building public support for 
what we do.  
The North Carolina story is one that 
can be replicated in other states. Strong 
state support can leverage strong 
federal support and strong private 
support, and vice versa. Each of these is 
mutually reinforcing of the others.  
Public Support for Faculty Salaries 
If there was a single thread that ran 
through all of my public presentations 
during my tenure, it was the importance 
of faculty salaries. We made faculty 
support the number one priority of the 
Carolina First Campaign, creating 225 
endowed professorships. It was also the 
centerpiece of our legislative efforts as 
well. 
I convinced the Board of Trustees of 
the importance of recruiting and 
retaining the best faculty as the 
centerpiece of all we were attempting to 
do. They got it. The PAC got it, and they 
were enormously helpful. Once we won 
the F&A battle, faculty salaries became 
the issue.  
I won’t belabor this issue, because 
you all understand the importance of 
faculty support to furthering the 
research agenda. The point I want to 
make here is that this is an argument 
that you have to win with the public and 
with policy makers.  
We fought this battle on three fronts 
– in the legislature, for state 
appropriations; with the system over the 
right to raise tuition when the state was 
unable to provide salary increases; and 
as the centerpiece of the fund-raising 
effort. 
I used to say that we wanted to have 
a faculty that the University of Chicago 
wanted. The trouble is that the 
University of Chicago (and their several 
peers) came calling. In 2003, we 
discovered that we were losing two out 
of three contested counter-offers.  This 
was a clear path to mediocrity. It was a 
crisis. We were at a difficult time in 
terms of state support, with several 
years of little or no increases in faculty 
compensation.  
North Carolina has a long tradition 
of low tuition coupled with generous 
state support. When that support went 
into decline, however, it was critical that 
we turn to tuition as a funding source 
for faculty salaries. We succeeded in 
getting authorization from the 
legislature to increase tuition and to 
keep those funds on campus for faculty 
support and need-based student aid. 
Simultaneously, we created the Carolina 
Covenant program, which guaranteed 
all students at or below 200% of the 
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federal poverty level, a debt-free 
graduation. This program became a 
national model. 
Even with these safeguards in place, 
I still had major battles with the system 
Board of Governors, which had little 
sympathy for the plight of its flagship 
research campus and no understanding 
of the competitive environment for 
research universities.  Once again, the 
PAC came to our rescue, convincing the 
legislature to overrule the system board.  
Perhaps my most telling argument to 
them was the fact that UNC faculty 
across the university averaged $211,000 
in external funding, while the average 
salary was about $165,000. Talk about a 
return on investment, this was it!  
Three years later, as a result of 
salary increases funded largely from 
tuition sources, we had reversed the 
negative trend, winning two out of 
every three contested retentions. By the 
time I left office, after two very good 
years of state appropriations, UNC’s 
faculty salaries, by rank, were higher 
than either Michigan or Virginia, and 
only slightly behind UC Berkeley and 
UCLA, our four major national peers.  
This was a key part of our overall 
strategy, and I am convinced our success 
with regard to faculty compensation was 
directly related to the success of our 
research effort. The run-up in research 
funding at UNC is an impressive story. 
External research at UNC increased from 
$375 Million in 2000 to $716 Million in 
2009, and as of June 30, 2010, has just 
crossed the $800 Million threshold.  
Vision 
In 2003, when the NIH Roadmap 
initiative was first announced, we 
commissioned a team of our best 
scientists, some of whom had just been 
recruited in the early wave of faculty 
appointments, to plan for the Roadmap, 
which itself, would map the future of 
NIH initiatives. As a result of this 
initiative, UNC led the nation with the 
number of Roadmap awards in the first 
year and again in the second.  
We were totally opportunistic in 
this case. We were fortunate that our 
strengths mapped well with where we 
thought the NIH wanted to go, and we 
put major resources into place in order 
to be competitive.  
Given the investment the state was 
also making in research infrastructure 
and, later, direct research support, we 
could leverage each of these elements 
constructively.  
Here, perhaps, I can derive another 
principle. To be successful in big 
science, institutions need to think 
strategically, placing bets by allocating 
resources where there may be a big 
return. This requires a certain degree of 
central planning, just as we did with the 
NIH roadmap. To be sure, a successful 
university will always have a balance of 
individual PI grants and some big team-
based grants. But the major leagues are 
dominated by the latter, not the former. 
This requires us to be brutally honest 
about our capabilities. There are some 
big opportunities out there that we 
simply do not have the resources to 
address. No amount of incremental 
funding would matter. We have to be 
willing to say no to investment in such 
ideas, attractive as they may be to one or 
more advocates. This is a critical point. 
Great universities do not dabble in areas 
where they lack strength or competence. It is 
important to know when to say no, to have 
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the courage to say it, and to stick with your 
decision.  
In 2006, in my fall State of the 
University address, I hit the campus 
with a blockbuster. With external 
funding at just short of $600 Million, I 
proposed establishing a goal of $1 billion 
in external funding by 2015. I arrived at 
this number in close consultation with 
Tony Waldrop, the vice chancellor for 
research, who assured me that, while 
this was a huge stretch goal, it was not 
impossible. This is what I said: 
Let us be crystal clear about this: $1 
billion is a stretch goal, more than $200 
million above what we might be expected to 
reach at our current trajectory. Some have 
argued that this is too high … unrealistic … 
that the uncompensated cost of this research 
will be unaffordable. To use a Jim Collins 
term, this is a “big, hairy, audacious goal,” 
appropriate for a university aspiring to be 
the leading public university. We should 
dream no small dreams.3 
Sometimes it is important for a 
leader to lay out something like this, 
without the assurance of success, 
remembering that big goals carry with 
them the high risk of failure. Just as I did 
not have absolute confidence in my 
promise in 2000 that we would triple the 
people’s investment in the bond issue, 
and I am not certain that UNC will reach 
this goal. But I am certain that it is on a 
positive trajectory to do exactly that, 
and, in my opinion, that is all that 
matters.  
I believe that this is one of the 
major responsibilities of leadership – 
to set a vision, and to be the principal 
cheer-leader for that vision.  
Over time, I discovered that one of 
the things state policy makers could 
quickly grasp was the connection 
between research, tech transfer, and job 
creation. When I arrived in Chapel Hill, 
UNC had a dismal record of creating 
spin-offs; the tech transfer office was 
seen as a barrier, rather than a bridge; 
the institutional culture was anything 
but supportive of entrepreneurship. We 
worked hard to change that culture. 
My partner in this effort was Tony 
Waldrop, the vice chancellor for 
research, whose title we changed to 
research and economic development. We 
beefed up the tech transfer office, 
brought in new leadership, and we 
listened to our most entrepreneurial 
faculty about what they wanted and 
needed. I made a key change in the 
Office of General Counsel, another office 
that was seen as a major obstacle.  
Over time, we saw a complete 
transformation of the culture for tech 
transfer from negative to positive. In 
2004 UNC received one of seven grants 
in a national competition from the 
Ewing M. Kauffman Foundation to 
embed entrepreneurship into the 
curriculum. By placing this new 
program as an undergraduate minor in 
the College, not in the Business School, 
we were able to impact the entire 
campus. As a result, today we have 
programs in social entrepreneurship, 
and artistic entrepreneurship, not just 
the usual suspects from science, 
technology, and the health professions. 
The culture really did change.  
However, as I left office in 2008, I 
could still occasionally hear complaints 
from our faculty about the pace of tech 
transfer. We still were not where we 
needed to be for our most ambitious 
faculty entrepreneurs. In December, 
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2009, Tony Waldrop and his colleagues 
announced a real breakthrough, that 
Cathy Innes, UNC’s director of the 
Office of Technology Development, 
called, “the Holy Grail in technology 
transfer transactions – the standard 
license agreement.”4 The Carolina 
Express License5 offers the same terms to 
all UNC start-ups and offers the best 
deal available from the University, 
covering a widely divergent stream of 
deal-flow with minimal negotiation. I 
can’t claim any credit for this 
development, which occurred after I left 
office, except to say that it all started 
with a fundamental policy shift to be an 
entrepreneurial university. In my 
opinion, this is where research 
universities need to be, especially public 
universities. That is at least a part of our 
reason for being as servants of society.  
This focus on economic 
development and job creation needs to 
be kept in focus and in balance. It is a 
hand that can easily be overplayed, and 
this is a trap that must be avoided. It 
cannot become the only metric for 
success. There is a second trap here that 
is especially tempting for trustees, and 
that is to make the funding stream from 
licensing fees the goal. Everybody wants 
the next Gatorade. The new Carolina 
Express License actually makes 
concessions on this point, sacrificing 
some short-term financial return in favor 
of more rapid spin-off creation.   
Finally, I must speak about the arts 
and humanities. I am personally 
sensitive to this area, because it is my 
own. I was acutely aware that in my first 
five years at UNC, much of my time and 
energy was spent on big science, 
medicine, and technology. These were 
areas of critical concern and major 
opportunity.  
However, I was also aware of the 
fact that I presided over a university 
with a distinguished history in the arts, 
humanities, and social sciences. In fact, 
one of Carolina’s strengths was the 
balance among each of these major 
areas. I regarded that history as a 
treasure that I was determined to 
preserve and protect.  
One of the early decisions that 
Provost Shelton and I made together 
when the budget cuts began early in the 
decade was that, at all costs, we were 
going to protect the library. Not the 
serials budget, but the acquisitions and 
operations budget of the library.  
As time passed and our position 
became more and more secure, we 
turned gradually to providing more 
direct support to the arts and 
humanities. We made a major 
investment in the performing arts 
presenting program, for example. We 
made sure that some F&A resources 
were directed to small grants programs 
for faculty in the arts and humanities. 
We went out of our way to celebrate 
individual faculty accomplishments – 
election to one of the national academies, 
appointments to endowed chairs. We 
raised some serious private money to 
support these areas. 
Here is the principle I want to 
evoke: A great research university must 
maintain a balance, an equilibrium, 
between those areas that garner major 
external funding, and those that never 
will. Core areas of strength in key areas 
of the arts, humanities, and social 
sciences must be maintained. This 
requires a certain sophistication in the 
  12 
internal funding model, openness and 
transparency in the flow of funds, but 
above all, the strength and courage of 
top leadership to do what is necessary to 
support faculty research and creative 
activity in these areas.  
Let me conclude, by simply 
summarizing the basic principles I have 
outlined in this paper, going back to my 
1997 presentation.  
• Lower the walls of the silos to 
facilitate inter-disciplinary work. 
Create inter- and multi-
disciplinary research clusters to 
address large problems.  
• The greater the attempt, the 
greater the reward, and the 
greater risk for failure. Fear of 
failure often leads to the greatest 
failure of leadership – the failure 
to act.  
• In developing institutional 
strategic objectives, one must 
always begin with an honest 
institutional assessment. I 
strongly believe in setting high 
goals – big hairy audacious goals, 
but those goals need to be 
grounded in reality. 
• Facilities matter. We are, indeed, 
in an arms race. Good research 
facilities are a magnet for faculty 
and graduate students. 
• Faculty have to be recruited in 
clusters in order to create major 
new initiatives, in addition to 
traditional departmental 
replacement hires. This requires 
an over-all architecture for 
strategic investment.  
• Strong support from the state for 
research can leverage stronger 
federal and private support. We 
must never apologize for 
research, but rather celebrate it 
and find ways to connect it to 
people’s lives.  
• Public support for faculty 
compensation is vital. Faculty 
compensation is the most critical 
area of national competition. 
Everything hangs on the quality 
of the faculty.  
• To be successful in big science, 
institutions need to think 
strategically, placing bets by 
allocating resources where there 
may be a big return. The major 
responsibility of top leadership is 
to set a vision and to be the 
cheer-leader-in-chief in 
articulating that vision to the 
university’s many constituencies.  
• A culture of entrepreneurship is 
a critical value. Success in 
economic development and job 
creation is the best argument for 
continued support for research. 
Avoid the traps. Don’t overplay 
this hand. This must not be the 
only metric of success. The 
funding stream from licensing is 
not the goal.  
• A great research university must 
maintain a balance, an 
equilibrium, between those areas 
that garner major external 
funding, and those that never 
will. It is a primary responsibility 
of top leadership to maintain 
areas of strength in key areas of 
the arts, humanities, and social 
sciences. This takes vision and 
courage.  
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